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Carrying Little Sticks: Is There a ‘Deterrence
Gap’ in Employment Standards Enforcement
in Ontario, Canada?
Eric TUCKER*, Leah F. VOSKO*, Rebecca CASEY*, Mark THOMAS*, John GRUNDY*
& Andrea M. NOACK*
This article assesses whether a deterrence gap exists in the enforcement of the Ontario
Employment Standards Act (ESA), which sets minimum conditions of employment in areas
such as minimum wage, overtime pay and leaves. Drawing on a unique administrative data set,
the article measures the use of deterrence in Ontario’s ESA enforcement regime against the role of
deterrence within two influential models of enforcement: responsive regulation and strategic
enforcement. The article finds that the use of deterrence is below its prescribed role in either
model of enforcement. We conclude that there is a deterrence gap in Ontario.
1 INTRODUCTION: EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT
While the regulation of minimum terms and conditions of employment dates back
to the master and servan\t regime created in the aftermath of the Black Death, its
contemporary form began to take shape with the rise of industrial capitalism in the
nineteenth century.1 Over time, child labour, health and safety, hours of work, and
wages, among others, all became the subject of legislation that stipulated minimum
standards enforceable by the state. These statutes vested inspectors with the power
to enter workplaces to determine whether employers were complying with mini-
mum standards and to issue orders2 requiring employers to bring their practices
into line with legal standards if they were not. Employers who violated the law
could also be prosecuted and fined or imprisoned.
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1 D. Hay & P. Craven, Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562–1955 (University
of North Carolina Press 2004); R. Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348–1381: A
Transformation of Governance and Law (University of North Carolina Press 1993).
2 The Ministry of Labour occasionally uses the term compliance ‘tool’ interchangeably with the term
compliance ‘order’ to refer to this means of closing a file. In the ensuing analysis, however, we use the
term ‘order’ for the sake of consistency as these tools are akin to orders.
Studies of the enforcement of these workplace laws have focused overwhel-
mingly on child labour and occupational health and safety (OHS), where research-
ers found that employers were rarely prosecuted for violating the law.3 Scholars
have fiercely debated the significance of this light-touch approach to enforcement.
Speaking of the enforcement of early nineteenth-century factory act legislation,
Carson characterized the non-prosecution of employers as part of a process that
conventionalized factory crime driven by the tension between the political demand
for protective workplace law and the structural and ideological obstacles to crim-
inalizing elites.4 Bartrip and Fenn rejected any explanation that linked enforcement
to class structure and conflict, but rather saw the development of legislation and
enforcement as a pragmatic search for efficiency.5 This debate was followed a
decade later by a bitter exchange between Pearce and Tombs and Hawkins, in
which Pearce and Tombs criticized what they characterized as the compliance
school of enforcement, with its emphasis on persuasion at the expense of punish-
ment, while Hawkins defended the importance of securing cooperation from the
regulated and questioned the efficacy of a punitive enforcement model.6 Since that
time, new models of enforcement have been developed that seek to overcome the
‘punish or persuade’ divide, but the debate over the role of deterrence and its
limited use continues.7
The Employment Standards Act (2000) (ESA) provides employees in Ontario
with a range of minimum standards, including minimum wage, hours of work and
overtime, vacation and holiday pay, and leave and termination entitlements, to
name a few. While in principle ESA entitlements were intended to be universal, in
fact numerous exemptions and special rules produce a tattered quilt of protection.8
Another way the ESA fails to protect employees is through gaps in its
3 E.g. see W. Carson, The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime, 7 I. J. Soc. L. 37 (1979); R.
Johnstone, Occupational Health and Safety Prosecutions in Victoria: An Historical Study, 12 Austr. J. L. L.
113 (2000); E. Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace (University of Toronto Press 1990); E.
Tucker, The Politics of Occupational Health and Safety in a Cold Climate: Diverging Trends in Worker
Protection and Participation in Canada, 1985–2000, 58 Rel. Ind./Ind. Rel. 395 (2003).
4 Carson, supra n. 3.
5 P. Bartrip & P. Fenn, The Conventionalization of Factory Crime – A Re-assessment, 8 I. J. Soc. L. 175
(1980). Also, see Carson’s response: W. Carson, Early Factory Inspectors and the Viable Class Society – A
Rejoinder, 8 I. J. Soc. L. 187 (1980).
6 F. Pearce & S. Tombs, Ideology, Hegemony, and Empiricism: Compliance Theories of Regulation, 30 Brit. J.
Crim. 423 (1990); K. Hawkins, Compliance Policy, Prosecution Policy, and Aunt Sally: A Comment on
Pearce and Tombs, 30 Brit. J. Crim. 444 (1990); F. Pearce & S. Tombs, Policing Corporate Skid Rows’: A
Reply Keith Hawkins, 31 Brit. J. Crim. 415 (1991); K. Hawkins, Enforcing Regulation: More of the Same
from Pearce and Tombs, 31 Brit. J. Crim. 427 (1991).
7 For example, see, S. Tombs & D. Whyte, The Myths and Realities of Deterrence in Workplace Regulation,
53 Brit. J. Crim. 746 (2013).
8 L. F. Vosko et al., Tattered Quilt? An Analysis of Exemptions and Special Rules Directed at Homecare
Workers, Liquor Servers and Agricultural Workers Under Ontario’s Employment Standards Act, 2000, Can. L.
& Empl. L. J. (forthcoming).
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enforcement.9 In this article, we are particularly concerned with one potential
source of under-enforcement, limited use of deterrence measures. Deterrence
measures penalize employers for violating ES laws and are imposed in addition to
restitution and compliance orders that require employers to pay employees what
they are legally owed and generally to obey the law. In the absence of deterrence,
employers bear no cost to violating the law, a situation that in theory is likely to
lead to continuing and, perhaps, higher levels of violation. Thus, our central
question is whether there is a deterrence gap in ES enforcement.
The answer to that question cannot be separated from the role of deterrence
theorized by a model of enforcement. In a pure compliance model, no deterrence
is required and so the idea of a deterrence gap is meaningless. However, all
enforcement theorists we know of insist that deterrence has some role to play,
the crucial question being its frequency, severity and the circumstances of its use.
Although it is not possible to avoid the debate over enforcement models, we seek
to reduce its salience by selecting two models against which to measure the use of
deterrence in Ontario’s ESA enforcement regime. The first, responsive regulation,
hypothesizes that deterrence will normally have a limited role to play, while the
other, strategic enforcement, sees a much greater role for deterrence measures.10 These
models will be described in more detail in the second section of the article, which
sets out the conceptual foundations of deterrence and how we might think about
whether a deterrence gap exists. One important advantage of our two-model
approach is that if a deterrence gap is found to exist in both, then a claim that
the current approach to ESA enforcement in Ontario is flawed would be particu-
larly powerful. If, on the other hand, a deterrence gap only exists in one enforce-
ment model but not in the other, then we would need to return to a discussion of
the strengths of the strategic and responsive regulation models themselves in order
to assess the efficacy of Ontario’s practice of ESA enforcement.
Part III of the article begins by putting the deterrence gap in historical
context, focusing on proactive inspections, financial penalties, and prosecutions
from the 1970s to the 1990s. The article then investigates the current practice of
enforcement by the Employment Standards Branch (ESB) of the Ministry of
9 L. F. Vosko, A. M. Noack & E. Tucker, Employment Standards (‘ES’) Coverage and Enforcement: A Scan
of Employment Standards Complaints and Their Resolution Under the Employment Standards Act, 2000
(‘ESA’), Ontario Ministry of Labour Changing Workplaces Review (2016), https://digitalcommons.
osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/265/ (accessed Dec.. 2019); C. M. Mitchell & J. C. Murray, Changing
Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace Rights, Final Report (2017), https://files.ontario.ca/books/
mol_changing_workplace_report_eng_2_0.pdf (accessed 10 Dec.. 2019).
10 I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1992); D. Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, 147 Int’l Lab. Rev. 349
(2008); D. Weil, Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and
Hour Division (2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf (accessed 10
Dec.. 2019).
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Labour (MOL), which is responsible for enforcing the ESA. Part IV examines
whether a deterrence gap exists in Ontario using publicly available documents and
a unique and previously unavailable database, the Employment Standards
Information System (ESIS). The ESIS contains, inter alia, information on all
submitted ES complaints and their outcomes, violations detected, inspections
conducted, and the use of enforcement mechanisms. A central feature of the
ESIS is that it provides a nearly complete census of Ontario’s ES enforcement
activities and their outcomes that is not otherwise publically available.11 Through
the ESIS we are able to identify the total number of detected violations and
calculate the frequency of the use of deterrence measures. We supplement the
ESIS with data from the Legal Services Branch of the Ministry of Labour, which is
responsible for more serious regulatory offence prosecutions and with reported
cases that provide information on the role of deterrence in sentencing convicted
offenders. We find that deterrence plays a minor role in ESA enforcement. Finally,
by way of conclusion, we argue that whether a responsive regulation or a strategic
enforcement approach is used, there is a deterrence gap in Ontario, and thus that
both specific and general deterrence should have larger roles to play in ES
enforcement.
2 CONCEPTUALIZING A DETERRENCE GAP
The strategies adopted by governments to enforce laws and policies entail various
forms of compliance and deterrence. There is a longstanding debate in the
literature over compliance and deterrence approaches to regulatory enforcement
whose foundations we discussed in a previous article.12
Since the early 1990s, regulatory theorists have sought ways to transcend the
deterrence/compliance debate by finding effective means of combining these
elements into a unified enforcement strategy. For many years, the most popular
model of this kind was responsive regulation, developed by Ayres and
Braithwaite.13 The key idea is that the best way to combine deterrence and
compliance measures in a manner that is responsive to the regulatory context is
to start with persuasion and other compliance measures and only escalate to more
coercive and deterrent measures if persuasion fails. In such a model, the regulator
11 The authors obtained access through a research sharing agreement between the Ontario Ministry of
Labour and our respective universities. Nevertheless, the views set out herein represent those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Ontario Ministry of Labour. For a discussion
of several limitations of ESIS data, see L. F. Vosko et al., The Compliance Model of Employment Standards
Enforcement: An Evidence-based Assessment of Its Efficacy in Instances of Wage Theft, 48 J. Indus. Rel. 256,
258 (2017).
12 Ibid.
13 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra n. 10.
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should have available a range of compliance and deterrence tools that permit a
graduated escalation to more coercive measures as needed. This approach results in
the famous enforcement pyramid, premised on the assumption that compliance
measures will be effective most of the time and that deterrence measures will only
be required in limited circumstances to deal with the minority of bad apples.
Within that model, the hammer of deterrence should be hidden most of the time
but must be brought down when needed. A deterrence gap exists if government
officials fail to escalate up the pyramid when compliance or lower-level deterrence
measures have failed to achieve obedience to the law.
The second model, strategic enforcement, builds from an analysis of the chan-
ging context of enforcement. In particular, Weil points to a number of factors that
make enforcement a challenge in the twenty-first century.14 While limited enforce-
ment resources are not a new phenomenon, in many jurisdictions neoliberal policies
have resulted in their reduction or the failure to increase resources in proportion to
the growth in employment and the number of workplaces. Equally important is that
enforcement has become more challenging because of significant changes to the
contemporary workplace environment. This environment is characterized by fissur-
ing of responsibility for employer obligations due to the growth of employment
agencies, franchising, subcontracting and independent contracting.15
Strategic enforcement is designed to maximize enforcement efficacy in this
context. The theory does not build on general assumptions about the character
of employers, but rather is concerned with the context in which employers
operate and the systemic pressures that tempt them to violate ES laws to make a
profit. Weil identifies four principles that should guide strategic enforcement:
prioritization; deterrence; sustainability; and systemic effects. Unlike Ayres and
Braithwaite, Weil does not believe that deterrence will rarely be necessary and
therefore can remain largely hidden and unused.16 Quite the opposite, he
argues deterrence measures should be carefully crafted and highly publicized
so that employers will know in advance that the cost of violating employment
standards are likely to be higher than its benefits. This strategic crafting is
crucial in precisely those contexts where employers may be under pressure to
violate the laws. To that end, Weil makes a number of concrete suggestions.
For example, civil monetary penalties should be routinely assessed, especially
for repeat offenders.17 Weil also recommends increased use of liquidated
14 Weil, supra n. 10, 2008.
15 D. Weil, The Fissured Workplace (Harvard University Press 2014); see also L. F. Vosko, Managing the
Margins: Gender, Citizenship and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment (Oxford University
Press 2010).
16 Weil, supra n. 10, 2010, at 81–83.
17 US law only permits civil monetary penalties for repeat offenders.
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damage awards,18 which compensate workers for the additional losses they
suffer when they do not get paid what they are owed, but which are likely
to be experienced by employers as deterrence measures because they pay more
than the amount saved by violating the law. Other deterrence measures
recommended by Weil include hot cargo embargo orders that prevent the
resale of goods produced in violation of ES, high profile prosecutions for ES
violations and criminal prosecutions in the most egregious cases.19 The strategic
enforcement model also counsels that enforcement, including deterrence mea-
sures, should target lead firms in supply chains that have the capacity to police
the activities of the subordinate entities.20 As with responsive regulation,
strategic enforcement also theorizes the possibility of a deterrence gap, but a
gap is much more likely to materialize given the greater role it is expected to
play in the mix of compliance and deterrence measures needed to secure
obedience to the law.
3 THE PRACTICE OF ESA ENFORCEMENT IN ONTARIO21
3.1 THE DETERRENCE GAP IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT, 1970S-2000S
From the inception of ESA implementation in 1969, the MOL adopted a complaints-
driven enforcement regime that emphasized the importance of employer-employee
‘self-reliance’ as a means to ensure compliance.22 This approach was adopted notwith-
standing that the employees most dependent on the ESA were largely non-union
workers in feminized jobs located at the bottom of the labour market and, therefore,
the least likely to be able to assert their rights.23 A limited proactive inspection program
supplemented the complaint system, but it declined significantly through the 1980s
and 1990s under Progressive Conservative (1980–85), Liberal (1985–1990) and New
Democratic Party (1990–1995) governments, in part due to insufficient budgets.24
18 Liquidated damages are a damage award, whose amount is determined in advance, that becomes
payable to the victim of a monetary violation without proof of damages.
19 Weil, supra n. 10, 2010, at 81–83.
20 Weil, supra n. 10, 2008, at 356; T. Hardy & J. Howe, Chain Reaction: A Strategic Approach to Addressing
Employment Noncompliance in Complex Supply Chains, 57 J. Indus. Rel. 563, 567–68 (2015).
21 This description only applies to non-unionized employees. Unionized employees cannot use the
public enforcement system but rather must seek a remedy for ES violations through the collective
agreement grievance process (ESA, s. 99).
22 Archives of Ontario, Record Group 7-1, File 7-1-0-1532.2, box 54. Letter, From Dalton Bales, Minister
(8 Aug. 1969).
23 J. Fudge, Labour Law’s Little Sister: The Employment Standards Act and the Feminization of Labour, 7 J. L.
& S. P. 73 (1991).
24 R. J. Adams, Employment Standards in Ontario: An Industrial Relations Systems Analysis, 42 Rel. Ind./Ind.
Rel. 46 (1987); M. P. Thomas, Regulating Flexibility: The Political Economy of Employment Standards
(McGill-Queen’s University Press 2009).
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Specifically, the number of proactive inspections went from 1304 in 1980–81 to a low
of 10 in 1996–97. Ironically, the number of proactive inspections began to rebound
beginning in 1997 under a right-leaning Progressive Conservative government.25
Nevertheless, the risk of violation detection through proactive inspection remained
small.
In addition, even in the unlikely event a violation was detected, the con-
sequences for the employer were not serious. Even though the ESA provided that
employers could be prosecuted and penalized for violations, and the size of the
penalties increased over time from a maximum CAD 1,000 in 1968 to CAD
10,000 in the 1980s, CAD 50,000 in the early 1990s, and CAD 500,000 in 2000,
the risk of being prosecuted was always quite low.26 When Employment Standard
Officers (ESO) detected violations by far their most common response was to
secure ‘voluntary’ compliance or to issue a compliance order. The worst that most
employers who violated the ESA could expect was that they would be required to
pay what they owed without the imposition of any penalty. Moreover, even in the
rare instance when employers were prosecuted, the levied fines almost never
approached the higher end of the scale.27 In summary, through the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s, the MOL relied primarily on a complaints-driven system that
was not only reactive, but that was deeply compliance based.28
By the last decade of the twentieth century, the ESA was becoming the focus
of heightened conflict. The growth of precarious employment – forms of employ-
ment characterized by high levels of uncertainty, low income, lack of union
coverage and control over the labour process and limited access to regulatory
protection – resulted in more workers being dependent on employment standards
for protection. At the same time many employers sought greater labour market
flexibility to maintain or enhance profitability in the face of increasing global
competition or supply-chain pressures.29 This produced a series of legislative and
regulatory changes from 1995 to the present that have attempted to manage these
contradictory pressures. On the one hand, Ontario governments embraced core
ideas of Regulatory New Governance (RNG) that sought to manage these contra-
dictory pressures through forms of internal responsibility premised on two
25 We do not have detailed data about inspections conducted in the 1980s and 1990s.
26 Adams, supra n. 24; Archives of Ontario, Record Group 7-186. Policy and Program Development,
(News Releases). Fines Increased for Workplace Violations (30 Apr. 1990); Employment Standards Act,
2000, S.O. 2000, c 41.
27 The Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime noted this concern in the 1980s. It found that the
small probability of detection and assessment, and the low expected penalty, did not deter ESA
violations. See, Ontario, Working Times: The Report of the Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and
Overtime (Toronto: Ministry of Labour 1987).
28 Archives of Ontario, Record Group 7-78. Choosing a Tribunal to Adjudicate Unjust Dismissal Cases
(1976–77).
29 Vosko, supra n. 15.
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assumptions. The first was that workers are empowered to secure their ES rights
through self-help and settlements with employers facilitated by ESOs and the
second was that employer violations stemmed from ill- or uninformed and inef-
fectual employers who would become compliant when employees brought pro-
blems to their attention. RNG’s affinity with responsive regulation, discussed
above, is obvious.
The weakness of RNG, however, is that it attempts to resolve the contra-
dictory pressures bearing on ES by effectively denying their salience.30 But gov-
ernments inspired by RNG cannot impose their imagined reality in the face of
effective opposition from advocacy groups, supported by research and amplified by
a sympathetic press, that highlight the lived reality of disempowered precarious
employees who face widespread ES violations that tend to be concentrated in
fissured and hyper-competitive sectors of the economy. Strategic enforcement,
discussed above, is more closely aligned with this material reality and, although
governments in Ontario have not formally embraced a strategic enforcement
approach, they have been pressured to enact legislation and adopt enforcement
policies at least partially responsive to the demands of advocacy groups. Deterrence
measures and their usage are often in the eye of this regulatory storm.
3.2 COMPLIANCE AND DETERRENCE TOOLS IN CONTEMPORARY ESA ENFORCEMENT
There is a range of enforcement tools currently available to ESOs, consisting of both
compliance and deterrence measures. We could present these tools as a pyramid,
with compliance measures on the bottom and deterrence measures toward the top,
but to do so would be problematic in two important ways. First, it might imply an
acceptance of the assumptions and desirability of the enforcement pyramid advocated
by responsive regulation, and second it prejudges precisely what is to be investigated,
the relative frequency of the use of compliance and deterrence measures. Therefore,
Figure 1 below lists the available tools according to their category.
Education and publicity play a key role in ESA enforcement. The MOL
adopted the Education, Outreach & Partnership (EOP) program in 2009 to:
• create an environment where employers and employees understand their
rights and obligations under the Employment Standards Act, 2000
(ESA);
30 L. F. Vosko et al., Challenging New Governance: Evaluating New Approaches to Employment Standards
Enforcement in Common Law Jurisdictions, 37 Econ. Indus. Dem. 373 (2016); E. Tucker, Old Lessons for
New Governance: Safety or Profit and the New Conventional Wisdom Ch. 4 (T. Nichols & D. Walters eds,
Baywood Press 2013).
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• increase employer awareness of responsibilities under the ESA by pro-
viding them with resources and tools to help them comply;
• encourage compliance with the ESA.31
Although the specific initiative is new, education has been a fundamental part of
ESA enforcement since its inception.32 The MOL provides online guides and tools
to assist employers and employees, produces a poster that employers must display in
every workplace, and translates materials into twelve languages.
Of course, compliance assistance does not produce perfect conformity with the
law and when employees experience violations they are encouraged to engage in self-
help by bringing the matter to the attention of their employer and seeking to have it
resolved voluntarily, a pure compliance measure. The Open for Business Act (2010)
made self-help a requirement, subject to a few exceptions.33 However, reflective of
the contradictory pressures operating within RNG, the requirement was repealed in
2017 as the result of a successful campaign to strengthen ES and its enforcement.34
Where self-help fails to resolve the employee’s concern, the employee may file a
complaint with the ESB, which normally assigns the matter to an ESO who will
conduct an investigation. During the course of that investigation, the complaint may
be settled (with or without the direct involvement of the ESO) or withdrawn by the
complainant. In the absence of a settlement or withdrawal, the ESO will assess the
complaint to determine whether a violation has occurred. If the ESO determines
that the employer has violated the Act, the employer may agree voluntarily to
comply, failing which the ESO will issue a compliance order. A compliance order
may require the employer to pay where there has been a monetary violation or it
may involve an order to do something else, depending on the violation. For
example, where an employer has terminated an employee for seeking to enforce
her or his ES rights, the ESO may order reinstatement and/or monetary damages. In
the case of record-keeping or posting violations, the ESO may order rectification.
These are all compliance measures that do not involve deterrence.35
As primarily a complaints-based system, the MOL is relatively passive about
detecting violations, leaving it to workers to bring violations to their attention.
31 Ontario Ministry of Labour, Education, Outreach and Partnership (2015), http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/
english/es/eop/index.php (accessed 9 Aug. 2018).
32 Thomas, supra n. 24.
33 M. Gellatly et al., ‘Modernising’ Employment Standards? Administrative Efficiency and the Production of the
Illegitimate Claimant in Ontario, Canada, 22 Econ. Lab. Rel. Rev. 81 (2011).
34 J. Grundy et al., Enforcement of Ontario’s Employment Standards Act: The Impact of Reforms, 43 C. P.
Pol’y/Analyse de Politiques 190 (2017); Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs Act (2017) S.O. 2017, c. 22.
35 Where an order to pay is issued, the employer is subject to a small administrative fee, the greater of
CAD 100 or 10% of amount ordered. Although conceptually and in the view of the MOL the fee is
not a punishment aimed at deterrence, arguably employers experience it as a sanction that can be
avoided by voluntarily paying and so it might be thought of as a routinely applied but low-level
deterrence measure.
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However, researchers recognize there are numerous reasons why individuals do
not complain and that proactive detection strategies (inspections) are necessary.36
In Ontario, workplace inspections can be divided into three main types: expanded
investigations arising out of an individual complaint; targeted or blitz inspections,
and regular inspections.37 When ESOs detect violations on inspections, they will
always apply compliance measures, including a settlement or a request for volun-
tary compliance or, failing that, a compliance order.
Regardless of whether violations are detected by complaint or inspection,
ESOs have the power to invoke deterrence measures in addition to compliance
measures and the key question for our research is the frequency of their use. Until
fairly recently, there was only one deterrence measure available to an ESO, but
new measures have been introduced to provide for lower level penalties that are
easier to impose. There are two low-level deterrence measures. The first is the
Notice of Contravention (NOC), introduced in 2000 and found in section 113 of
the ESA:
113. (1) If an employment standards officer believes that a person has contravened a
provision of this Act, the officer may issue a notice to the person setting out the officer’s
belief and the prescribed penalty for that contravention.38
Ontario Regulation 289/01 sets out the prescribed penalties. Prior to 2018, the
penalty for a first contravention was CAD 250, for a second CAD 500 and a third
or subsequent contravention CAD 1,000. If the contravention affects more than
one employee and is not for a violation of a posting or record-keeping require-
ment, the fine can be multiplied by the number of employees affected. As a result
of the political pressure to strengthen enforcement, starting 1 January 2018 penal-
ties were increased to begin at CAD 350 and go up to CAD 1500. However, later
that year a Conservative government was elected and it restored the older schedule
of fines. A ‘name and shame’ provision (section 113(6.2)) was added in 2017 to
allow publication of the names of persons who have been issued a NOC. An
employer who is served with a NOC is deemed to be guilty and liable to pay the
prescribed penalty unless the employer applies to the Ontario Labour Relations
Board (OLRB) for a review within thirty days. If the employer files an application
for review, the board holds an adjudicative hearing and the onus is on the Director
36 See D. Weil & A. Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.
S. Workplace, 27 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 59 (2006).
37 For record-keeping purposes, the MOL divides inspections into eight main types and a category
labelled ‘other’. For the record, the eight types are: expanded investigations, targeted inspections,
previous violator inspections, regular inspections, re-inspections, Temporary Help Agency (THA)
Blitz inspections, THA Blitz re-inspections, and compliance check investigations. However, the three
categories we use are sufficient for the purposes of our analysis.
38 Employment Standards Act, supra n. 26, at s. 113.
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of the ESB to prove the contravention on a balance of probabilities. If the Director
is successful, the OLRB may still reduce the penalty.39
The second lower-level deterrence measure, introduced in 2004, is tickets
issued pursuant to the Provincial Offences Act, (POA), Part I. Regulation 950 made
pursuant to the POA determines which violations of provincial statutes are
ticketable.40 The government amended the regulation in 2004 to create ticketable
violations under the ESA.41 There are currently fifty-nine ticketable ESA viola-
tions and ESOs are empowered to issue tickets when they detect ticketable
violations. The Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice sets the fine. As of
2018, it is set at CAD 295 for every violation. There is also a victim fine surcharge
added to each fine, which is set at CAD 60 for fines in the ESA range.42 Money
collected from the fines goes to the municipality in which the offence occurred,
while the victim fine surcharge goes into a Victims’ Justice Fund used to com-
pensate the victims of crime.43
Prior to the creation of NOCs and ticketable violations, the only deterrence
tool was a regulatory offence prosecution under Part III of the POA. The ESA
makes it an offence to contravene the act or its regulations, or to fail to comply
with an order or direction issued by an ESO.44 Individuals are liable to be fined up
to CAD 50,000 or imprisoned for up to twelve months. Corporations are liable to
be fined up to CAD 100,000 for a first offence, CAD 250,000 for a second offence
and CAD 500,000 for a third or subsequent offence. Directors of corporations can
also be charged if the director fails to comply with an order to pay wages issued
against the directors pursuant to sections 106 and 107.45 Finally, where the
employer is a corporation, an officer, director or agent of the corporation may
be prosecuted for authorizing or permitting or acquiescing in the contravention.46
The ultimate deterrence measure would be prosecution under the Criminal
Code of Canada (1985). It is a little-known fact that in 1935 the Code was amended
to make it a crime to knowingly pay less than the minimum wage, although
amendments made during the legislative process and narrow judicial interpretation
39 Ibid., at s. 122.
40 Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 2000, c. P. 33.
41 Proceedings Commenced by Certificate of Offence, O. Reg. 162/04 filed 10 June 2004 (as amended) under
Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33.
42 Victim Fine Surcharges, O.Reg. 161/00, filed 1 Apr. 2000 under Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
P.33.
43 There is also a provision in the POA for commencing a Part I prosecution by issuing a summons,
which may be used where the violation is not ticketable. In such a case, the maximum penalty on
conviction is CAD 1,000. To our knowledge, summonses were not used in ESA enforcement during
the period under examination, 2012/13 to 2014/15.
44 Employment Standards Act, supra n. 26, at s. 132.
45 Ibid., at s. 136.
46 Ibid., at s. 137.
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thereafter resulted in the provision being inoperable.47 Most of this section of the
Code was repealed in 1955, but it is still a criminal offence intentionally to falsify an
employment record by any means, including the punching of a time clock.48 In
principle, an employer could commit criminal fraud in relation to a monetary
violation, but there is no record of any employer being charged for this crime.49
4 PUTTING DETERRENCE TOOLS TOWORK: 2012/13 TO 2014/1550
4.1 ESTABLISHING BASELINES: DETECTED VIOLATIONS AND COMPLIANCE MEASURES
To put the frequency of deterrence tool usage into perspective, it is necessary to
establish some kind of baseline. We use detected and recorded violations from
complaints and inspections, the two ways violations come to the attention of
ESOs. However, we do so with several caveats. As we noted earlier, researchers
have established that particularly under a complaints-based system the number of
detected violations represent a small proportion of the total number of violations.
In addition, the ESO may not record every violation he or she observes. ESOs
exercise considerable discretion when conducting inspections and may choose
simply to let some violation go unrecorded.51 The decision to use detected and
recorded violations as opposed to violations is on the one hand a pragmatic
response to the limitations of our data, but is also justified because the focus of
this analysis is on the behaviour of enforcement officials when a violation comes to
their attention and they decide to take some official action.
A second caveat about our use of ESO-detected and recorded violations as the
baseline is that the ESO’s determination that a violation has or has not occurred
may be reversed at a later stage. First, ESO orders or failures to issue an order may
be challenged, in which case the OLRB conducts a review and can substitute its
judgment for that of the ESO. Second, as mentioned, the OLRB may also not
uphold a NOC. Third, employers charged with Part I or Part III offences under
the POA may successfully defend themselves in court. As a result, ESO-detected
and recorded violations are not a completely accurate count of the number of
47 E. Tucker, When Wage Theft Was a Crime in Canada, 1935-1955: The Challenge of Using the Master’s
Tools Against the Master, 54 Osg. Hall L. J. 933 (2017).
48 Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 398.
49 Ibid., at s. 380.
50 The MOL’s fiscal year runs from Apr. 1 to Mar. 31. The fiscal year of a complaint is established by the
day the MOL receives the complaint. The fiscal year of an inspection is the day of the ESOs first visit
to the workplace. We have restricted our analysis to these three years because they were the only years
for which ESIS had complete data on the outcomes of both complaints and inspections at the time the
research for this article was conducted.
51 See e.g. K. Hawkins, Law as a Last Resort (Oxford University Press 2002); M. Lipsky, Street-Level
Bureaucracy (Russell Sage Foundation 1980).
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substantiated violations. Nevertheless, we are confident that the overall impact of
these events on the total number of actual violations is quite small. More impor-
tantly, any differences that do result are not terribly germane to our analysis, which
is focused in the first instance on how often ESOs use deterrence tools when they
detect and record violations.
In what follows we examine ESO detected and recorded violations, looking first
at complaints and then at inspections. These ways of detecting violations require
separate analyses for two reasons. First, as we shall see, the process of detecting and
recording violations is different for complaints than it is for inspections. The second
and more important reason for examining complaint and inspection violations sepa-
rately is that it allows us to determine whether ESOs use deterrence measures
differently depending on the context in which they detect the violation.
4.1.[a] Complaints
When complaints enter the MOL’s system and are recorded in the ESIS database,
there are five possible outcomes:
• withdrawal by the complainant
• settlement if the complainant and the employer agree to certain terms
• denial if no violation is found
• validation (a violation is found) and resolution through voluntary com-
pliance by the employer;
• validation and issuance of a compliance order against the employer.
Of the total of 44,742 complaints recorded between 2012/13 and 2014/15, 24%
were withdrawn, 13% resulted in settlements, 20% were denied, 22% were
validated and the employer complied voluntarily, and 21% were validated and
required that a compliance order be issued.
These outcomes, however, do not tell us the percentage of complaints in
which there was an ES violation. Rather, the ESIS provides us with informa-
tion on detected violations only. For a violation to be detected the claim must
be assessed by an ESO, but claims that are withdrawn or settled are not
assessed. The fact that a claim is withdrawn or settled does not mean that
there was not a violation, however, since there are many reasons why employ-
ees may settle or withdraw complaints before it is assessed even though they
experienced a violation. These data do not show in what percentage of these
cases violations occurred – only that 63% of complaints were assessed between
2012/13 and 2014/15.
Examining when violations occur in more detail, violations were detected
in a total of 19,260 of the 44,742 complaints or 43% of the time, but if we
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consider only assessed complaints (28,139), then violations are found 68% of
the time. At least one monetary violation was detected in 18,930 complaints
(67% of assessed complaints), while at least one non-monetary violation was
detected in 664 complaints (2% of assessed complaints). Monetary and non-
monetary violations are occasionally found in the same complaint, which is
why the sum of monetary and non-monetary violations is greater than the
number of complaints with any violation.
When we turn to the number of violations, we see that in total 34,626
violations, both monetary and non-monetary, were detected by ESOs from
complaints (Table 1), or on average 11,542 annually. There are more violations
than there are complaints with violations because when a complaint has a violation,
it is likely to have more than one violation. On average, each complaint with a
violation had 1.8 violations. As expected, monetary violations constitute 98% of all
detected violations.
Table 1 Number of Violations Detected in Complaints and their Outcomes, by Fiscal Year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Total Number of Violations 12,079 12,071 10,476 34,626
Monetary and Non-Monetary
Violations
Total Number of Monetary
Violations
11,825 11,798 10,217 33,840
Total Number of Non-Monetary
Violations
254 273 259 786
Outcomes of Complaints with
Monetary Violations
Voluntary Compliance 5,358 5,037 4,263 14,658
Compliance Ordered 6,761 5,954 19,182
Outcomes of Complaints with
Non-Monetary Violations
Voluntary Compliance 203 210 201 614
Compliance Ordered 51 63 58 172
Source: Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) data 2012/2013 to 2014/2015
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For every detected violation compliance is sought either through securing
voluntary compliance by the employer without a compliance order, or by ordering
compliance. Overall, employers voluntarily complied in rectifying 15,272 of the
34,626 detected violations from complaints, or 44% of the time. It was necessary to
order employer compliance for the other 19,354 detected violations, or 56% of the
time. If we disaggregate monetary and non-monetary violations, we find that ESOs
achieved voluntary compliance in 43% of monetary claims and 78% of non-monetary
claims. The flipside is that ESOs ordered compliance in 57% of monetary violations
and 22% of non-monetary violations. The large difference between voluntary and
ordered compliance for monetary and non-monetary violations presumably reflects
the fact that correcting non-monetary violations costs employers little or nothing,
while correcting monetary violations by definition require a monetary payment. The
lower rate of voluntary compliance for detected monetary violations may suggest that,
contrary to compliance theory, a large number of these violations are not innocent
employer errors.52 If that is the case, we might expect to see deterrence measures used
more frequently for monetary violations detected by complaint.
4.1.[b] Inspections
In Ontario, proactive inspections are a secondary means of detecting violations.
However, the inspections data must be approached with some caution and cannot
be taken as a complete record of all violations that are found during an ESO inspection.
As discussed previously, ESOs exercise an enormous amount of discretion in how they
respond to an observed violation. We can assume there is an under-reporting of
violations detected by inspection, but we have no way to estimate its extent.
For the three years under examination (2012/13 to 2014/15) there were 5,998
inspections (Table 2). Over these three fiscal years, there was a steady decrease in the
number of annual inspections completed. In 2012/13, ESOs completed 2,349 inspec-
tions compared to 1,747 inspections in 2014/15. Among all inspections, ESOs
detected and recorded one or more violations on 3,968 occasions or 65% of the
time. In 2012/13 the number of inspections with violations was 71% and then
decreased to 56% in 2014/15. Because ESOs detect and record multiple violations,
a total of 11,563 violations were found (Table 2), amounting to, on average, 2.9
violations per inspection with violations. Of these, 3,241, or 28% were for monetary
violations, the remaining 8,322 (72%) being for non-monetary violations. The rela-
tively low percentage of monetary violations recorded on inspections contrasts sharply
with the results from complaints where monetary violations predominated (98%). The
difference is explained by the fact that, while employees are significantly more likely to
52 Vosko et al., supra n. 11.
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complain about monetary than non-monetary violations, in inspections ESOs are
directed to evaluate employers’ compliance with only eleven specific employment
standards, many of which relate to non-monetary employment standards such as
record-keeping and posting requirements. When ESOs detect monetary violations
in workplace inspections, the amount of restitution to which employees are entitled is
less than entitlements that result from complaints. The median amount of employee
entitlements for violations of employment standards detected via complaints between
2012/13 and 2014/15 was CAD 1,062, whereas the median amount of employee
entitlements for violations of employment standards detected via workplace inspec-
tions during this same time period was CAD 745.
Table 2 Number and Percentage of Violations Detected in Workplace Inspections and
their Outcomes, by Fiscal Year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Total Number of Inspections 2,349 1,902 1,747 5,998
Number of Inspections without
Violations
672 602 756 2,030
% of Inspections without Violations 28.6% 31.7% 43.3% 33.8%
Number of Inspections with
Violations
1,677 1,300 991 3,968
% of Inspections with violations 71.4% 68.3% 56.7% 66.2%
Total Number of Violations 4,958 3,786 2,849 11,593
Number of Monetary Violations 1,355 1,127 793 3,275
% of Monetary Violations 27.3% 29.8% 27.8% 28.2%
Number of Non-Monetary Violations 3,603 2,659 2,056 8,318
% of Non-Monetary Violations 72.7% 70.2% 72.2% 71.8%
Outcomes of Inspections with
Monetary Violations
Voluntary Compliance, no compliance
order
117 155 72 344
Voluntary Compliance, compliance
order issued
993 786 657 2,436
Compliance Ordered 245 185 64 494
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2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Outcomes of Inspections with Non-Monetary
Violations
Voluntary Compliance, no compliance
order
245 289 130 664
Voluntary Compliance, compliance
order issued
2,630 2,064 1,773 6,467
Compliance Ordered 723 293 150 1,166
Source: Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) data 2012/2013 to 2014/2015
As is the case for violations detected from complaints, ESOs take compliance
measures for every violation recorded during an inspection. When a violation is
detected, the ESO can close the file in three ways: voluntary compliance by the
employer in the absence of a compliance order; voluntary compliance by the
employer in the presence of a compliance order; and no voluntary compliance by
the employer leading to the issuance of a compliance order, typically an Order to
Pay.53 Overall, for the 11,571 violations detected,54 ESOs achieved voluntary
compliance by the employer in the absence of a compliance order in 1,008
instances, or 9% of the time. ESOs achieved voluntary compliance by the
employer in the presence of a compliance order in 8,903 instances, or 77% of
the time. Finally, ESOs did not achieve voluntary compliance, leading to the
issuance of a compliance order, in 1,660 instances, or 14% of the time. If we
disaggregate monetary and non-monetary violations, we find that voluntary
compliance was achieved in 85% of monetary claims and 86% of non-monetary
claims. The higher rate of voluntary compliance, including among employers
issued compliance orders, on inspections compared to complaints, particularly in
regard to monetary complaints, might suggest that violations detected on inspec-
tions are more likely to be the result of inadvertence and therefore these employ-
ers are more inclined to comply forthwith when the violation is brought to their
attention.
53 See Ontario Ministry of Labour, Administrative Manual for Employment Standards (AMES) (Ontario
Government 2017a). In its current Administrative Manual for Employment Standards (AMES), the MOL
indicates that compliance orders may be issued in situations where an employer has agreed to
voluntarily comply. According to the manual, ‘[i]ssuing a Compliance Order when there has been
voluntary compliance ensures that there is a record of enforcement activity resulting from the contra-
vention’, Ontario Ministry of Labour, supra n. 53, at Ch. 7.5.6, emphasis added.
54 Note that this number is slightly different from the total number of violations detected in Table 2. The
discrepancy represents 22 inspections with violations that are missing information about which
compliance measure was used.
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4.1[c] Combined Data on Violations55
If we combine the data on detected violations from complaints and inspections, we
see there were 46,189 total detected and recorded violations, or on average 15,396
per year. There is a noticeable decline in the total number of violations in each year
from both complaints and inspections, but because of the frailties we noted earlier in
the processes that result in violations being detected and recorded, we do not believe
this data supports the claim that ESA violations are decreasing in Ontario.
Table 3 Sources and Types of Violations, by Fiscal Year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Source of Violation
Complaint 12,079 12,071 10,476 34,626
Inspection 4,958 3,786 2,849 11,593
Violation Type
Monetary 13,180 12,925 11,010 37,115
Non-Monetary 3,857 2,932 2,315 9,104
Total Violations 17,037 15,857 13,325 46,219
Source: Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) data 2012/2013 to 2014/2015
4.2 USE OF DETERRENCE MEASURES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
The use of compliance measures does not preclude the use of deterrence measures
for the same violation. Every violation detected could result in the imposition of a
deterrence measure notwithstanding that the employer has voluntarily agreed to
comply or been ordered to do so. Recall that section 113 of the ESA authorizes an
ESO to issue a notice of contravention whenever the ESO ‘believes that a person
has contravened a provision of this Act’ and section 132 provides that ‘a person
who contravenes this Act or the regulations … under this Act or the regulations is
guilty of an offence.’ Therefore, it is a matter of discretion and policy, not law, as
to whether deterrence measures are used in addition to compliance measures when
55 We note that combining the data in this way potentially conflates two units of analysis. In workplace
inspections, violations are detected at the level of the employer. In complaints, violations are detected
at the level of the employee. In some instances, multiple complaints are filed against a single employer
and thus counted as multiple violations, whereas in an inspection this would be counted as a single
violation.
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violations are detected. In fact, as we see below, deterrence measures are rarely
used.
4.2[a] Low Level Deterrence Measures: Notices of Contravention and Part I Tickets
4.2[a][i] Notices of Contravention (NOC)
Notwithstanding that NOCs can be issued for any violation of the ESA, over the
three-year period under discussion, ESOs issued a total of 207 NOCs for violations
detected via complaints and 96 NOCs for violations detected via workplace
inspections (Table 4).56
Table 4 The Use of Notices of Contravention (NOCs), by Fiscal Year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Complaints Total Number of
Violations
12,079 12,071 10,476 34,626
Total Number of NOCs 60 79 68 207
% of Violations with a
NOC
0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Monetary Violations 11,825 11,798 10,217 33,840
Monetary Violations with
a NOC
44 59 35 138
% of Monetary
Violations with a NOC
0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4%
Non-Monetary Violations 254 273 259 786
Non-Monetary Violations
with a NOC
16 20 33 69
% of Non-Monetary
Violations with a NOC
6.3% 7.3% 12.7% 8.8%
Inspections Total Number of
Violations
4,958 3,786 2,849 11,593
56 Due to small cell counts, we are unable to disaggregate NOCs into monetary and non-monetary
violations.
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2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Total Number of NOCs 42 20 34 96
% of Violations with a
NOC
0.8% 0.5% 1.2% 0.8%
Source: Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) data 2012/2013 to 2014/2015
Put differently, ESOs issue NOCs for less than 1% of all detected violations in both
complaints and inspections (Table 4). Focusing on complaints, 67% of NOCs are
issued for monetary violations, but monetary violations are far more frequent than
non-monetary violations, so that NOCs are issued for only 0.4% of all detected
monetary violations, compared to 9% of non-monetary violations (Table 4). It is
not obvious why this should be the case since most people view monetary
violations as more serious than non-monetary ones, given their immediate impact
on workers. NOCs are used to approximately the same degree for violations
detected in inspections as they are in complaints (0.8% for inspections compared
to 0.6% for complaints).
4.2[a][ii] Part I Tickets
Between 2013/14 and 2014/15, during the complaints process, ESOs issued
307 Part I tickets, 203 for monetary violations and 104 for non-monetary
violations (Table 5). For complaints data, the information about tickets issued
in 2012/13 has been suppressed due to the very infrequent use of tickets. ESOs
issued more tickets in inspections and therefore data are available for 2012/13
to 2014/15. During this period (2012/13 to 2014/15), ESOs issued 905 Part I
tickets, 644 for monetary violations and 261 for non-monetary violations.
Clearly, ESOs use tickets as a low-level deterrence measure more often than
NOCs, which ESOs issued a total of 303 times over the same period. The
Administrative Manual for Employment Standards used by Ministry staff during the
period under study explains why. It directed ESOs to use tickets rather than
NOCs whenever there is a choice so ESOs issued NOCs only if the contra-
vention was not a ticketable offence.57
ESOs issued tickets for 1.4% of all ticketable violations detected from com-
plaints. Oddly, they issued tickets for less than 1% of monetary ticketable violations
and nearly 30% of non-monetary ticketable violations. The more frequent use of
57 Ontario Ministry of Labour, Administrative Manual for Employment Standards Ch. 7.5.7 (Ontario
Government 2014). The direction has been removed from the current AMES. See Ontario Ministry
of Labour, supra n. 53, at Ch. 7.5.7.
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tickets for non-monetary violations is somewhat counter-intuitive given that
monetary violations would seem to be more serious in their immediate conse-
quences. Of course, unlike NOCs, ESOs can only issue tickets for ticketable
violations, not for every violation of the ESA. However, it is fair to say that almost
all monetary violations are ticketable.
ESOs issue tickets far more frequently for ticketable violations detected on
inspections than through complaints. As Table 5 shows, ESOs issued tickets for 8%
of all ticketable violations detected by inspection. However, when we disaggregate
monetary and non-monetary ticketable violations detected on inspections, we find
that ESOs issue tickets for 20% of the monetary violations they detect, compared
to 3% of non-monetary violations they detect. This pattern is the reverse of what
we saw for the use of tickets in the context of complaints and may be explained by
the overrepresentation of non-monetary violations in workplace inspections and
the underrepresentation of non-monetary violations in complaints.
Table 5 The Use of Part I Tickets, by Fiscal Year
Complaints 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Ticketable Offenses — 11,751 10,196 21,947
All Tickets — 121 186 307
% of Ticketable Offences with
Tickets
— 1.0% 1.8% 1.4%
Monetary Ticketable Offenses — 11,573 10,021 21,594
Tickets Issued for Monetary
Offences
— 78 125 203
% of Monetary Ticketable
Offences with Tickets
— 0.7% 1.2% 0.9%
Non-Monetary Ticketable
Offences
— 178 175 353
Tickets Issued for Non-Monetary
Offences
— 43 61 104
% of Non-Monetary Ticketable
Offences with Tickets
— 24.2% 34.9% 29.5%
Inspections 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Ticketable Offenses 4,870 3,723 2,781 11,374
All Tickets 298 348 259 905
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Complaints 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
% of Ticketable Offences with
Tickets
6.1% 9.3% 9.3% 8.0%
Monetary Ticketable Offenses 1,352 1,124 790 3,266
Tickets Issued for Monetary
Offences
203 255 186 644
% of Monetary Ticketable
Offences with Tickets
15.0% 22.7% 23.5% 19.7%
Non-Monetary Ticketable
Offences
3,518 2,599 1,991 8,108
Tickets Issued for Non-Monetary
Offences
95 93 73 261
% of Non-Monetary Ticketable
Offences with Tickets
2.7% 3.6% 3.7% 3.2%
Source: Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) data 2012/2013 to 2014/2015
Note: We removed the complaint data from 2012/13 from this analysis due to small cell
counts for tickets, reflecting their extremely low level use by ESOs
Among complaints in 2013/14 and 2014/15, ESOs most commonly issued tickets
for monetary violations related to failure to pay wages (34%), vacation pay (24%),
and overtime pay (15%). The most common ticket issued for non-monetary
violations is for record-keeping (29%). Among inspections, the trend for most
common tickets issued between 2012/13 to 2014/15 is slightly different. The most
common tickets issued for monetary violations relate to holiday pay (42%) and
overtime pay (27%). For non-monetary violations, the most common tickets are
for record keeping (13%) and requiring employees to work excess hours (8%).58
4.2[a][iii] Low-Level Deterrence Measures Combined
Despite the differences in the procedures for issuing, enforcing and challenging
NOCs and tickets, they are similar in terms of the small size of the penalty and so it
is useful to consider them in combination in order to appreciate the use of low-
level deterrence measures.
58 Similar data are described in R. Casey et al., Using Tickets in Employment Standards Inspections: Deterrence
as Effective Enforcement in Ontario, Canada?, 29 Econ. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 228 (2018), https://doi.org/10.
1177/1035304618769772 (accessed 19 June 2018). However, in that paper the analysis included an
additional year of data (2012/13 to 2015/16).
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Table 6 The Use of Deterrence Measures (Notices of Contravention (NOCs) and Part I
Tickets Combined), 2012/13 to 2014/15
NOCs
Issued
Tickets
Issued
Total % of Violations with
Deterrence Measure
Monetary Violations 181 847 1,028 2.8%
Non-Monetary Violations 122 365 487 5.3%
Total 303 1,212 1,515 3.3%
Source: Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) data 2012/2013 to 2014/2015
Overall ESOs use low-level deterrence measures very infrequently. More than
96% of the violations they detect and record do not attract a low-level deterrence
measure.
4.2[b] Higher Level Deterrence Measures
In principle, there are two higher-level deterrence measures available, Part III
prosecutions under the Provincial Offences Act and prosecutions under the Criminal
Code for intentionally falsifying employment records or fraud. To our knowledge,
no employer has been charged under the Criminal Code for wage theft since it was
revised in the 1950s (Tucker 2017). Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the use of
Part III prosecutions.
Unlike the deterrence measures we have discussed to this point, the ESO does
not determine whether a Part III prosecution is launched. Rather, the ESO makes
a recommendation to prosecute. The Regional Program Coordinator (RPC) and
Manager review that recommendation and if all agree the ESO prepares a Crown
Brief that is submitted to the Legal Services Branch (LSB) for consideration. If the
ESO, RPC and Manager are not in agreement about whether to recommend a
prosecution to the LSB, the matter is referred to the Regional Program Director
who decides. If the LSB determines a prosecution is appropriate, it lays charges
against the defendant or defendants. The case will either be resolved by a plea deal
agreed to by the defendant(s) and the Crown, or by trial.59
Ideally, we would like to have data on how often ESOs recommend prosecutions
and on how often the ESB recommends prosecutions to the LSB. Unfortunately, we
only have data for prosecutions launched and for convictions. The LSB provides data
on prosecutions by calendar year (ESIS data uses the fiscal year) and the MOL posts
59 Ontario Ministry of Labour, supra n. 53 at Ch. 7A, 6.
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data on convictions on its website. Table 7 provides data on the number of prosecu-
tions, defendants and charges launched by the LSB and the number of prosecutions,
defendants and charges for which there are convictions.60
Table 7 The Use of Part III Prosecutions and Convictions, by Year
2012 2013 2014 Total
Prosecutions
Launched 9 13 12 34
With Convictions 6 9 5 20
Defendants
Charged 14 27 16 57
Convicted 6 10 5 21
Charges
Laid 44 65 58 167
With Convictions 15 18 8 41
Source: Ontario Ministry of Labour - Legal Services Branch (LSB) data January 1st, 2012 to
December 31st, 2014
Note: Data from the LSB are recorded by calendar year
Table 7 shows that the LSB initiates prosecutions infrequently. In the three years
for which we have data, the LSB launched 34 prosecutions, involving 57 defen-
dants and 167 charges. Because our data is for calendar years and not fiscal years,
we cannot accurately calculate the percentage of violations that resulted in Part III
prosecutions, but as we will see this number is not meaningful in any event. The
LSB is relatively successful in obtaining convictions when it prosecutes (around
60% of prosecutions and defendants), but around 75% of the charges are dropped
or do not result in convictions.
While a detailed analysis of the role of prosecutions in the enforcement
process is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to understand that the
LSB never prosecutes employers and directors for violating employees’ rights.
Rather, the LSB only prosecutes in response to an employer’s or director’s
failure to comply with an order to pay wages or to reinstate and/or compensate
60 Within a prosecution there may be multiple defendants and a defendant may be charged with multiple
violations. Multiple defendant cases typically involve situations in which the employer and directors
have been charged together.
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in the case of a reprisal or leave of absence violation, or for interference with an
ESO. In other words, the LSB prosecutes employers for defying the authority
of the ESO and, by extension, the state, not for the violation of the workers’
substantive rights in the first instance. If we were to calculate the percentage of
underlying violations that are prosecuted on the same basis as we calculated the
frequency of NOCs and Part I tickets, the percentage would effectively be
zero.61
One final issue is the question of penalty. When articulating sentencing prin-
ciples, judges embrace the principle of deterrence. For example, in R v. Blondin,
discussed in more detail below, Justice of the Peace Bubrin extensively cited a
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in occupational health and safety case,
Regina v. Cotton Felts, on the importance of deterrence in sentencing.62 In that case
the court held, ‘Above all, the amount of the fine will be determined by the need to
enforce regulatory standards by deterrence,’ and then discussed the role of specific
and general deterrence. However, notwithstanding their principled embrace of
deterrence in sentencing, it is not obvious that the courts translate principle into
practice. Over the three calendar years covered in this study, the total amount of the
fines imposed was CAD 1,085,651, or an average of CAD 26,479 for each of the 41
charges with a conviction. This figure, however, is distorted by a single fine in one
prosecution (with seven charges) of CAD 350,000. If we eliminate this anomalous
instance, the average for the remaining 34 convictions is CAD 21,637. In either case,
this represents a relatively small fraction of the maximum first offence fine for an
individual (CAD 50,000) and especially for a corporation (CAD 100,000).
There are, however, some exceptions. In Blondin the court sentenced the
defendant to three months imprisonment and a fine of CAD 50,000 and fined his
corporations an additional CAD 300,000.63 This punishment was in addition to an
order to pay restitution to the employees who collectively were owed CAD
142,000. Courts sentenced ESA violators to jail terms in two other cases. One
involved Peter Check, as the director of a (presumably) small corporation, which
was the employer of record. He was convicted of permitting or acquiescing in the
failure to comply with an order to pay and was fined CAD 18,750 and sentenced
to ninety days in jail.64 The other case involved Peter Sesek who owed forty-three
employees around CAD 127,000 in wages dating back to 2014. The MOL issued
61 In July 2018 we received data on Part III prosecutions for 2015 and 2106, beyond the timeframe of
this analysis. However, that data show a significant increase in the use of Part III prosecutions,
although it does not allow us to determine whether there has been a change in the circumstances in
which the LSB launches prosecutions.
62 R. v. Blondin, 2012, ONCJ 826; R. v. Cotton Felts, 1982, 2 CCC (3d) 287.
63 Blondin, ibid.
64 Check and his corporations failed to pay students he had hired to work as lifeguards. Three orders to
pay were issued for nearly CAD 50,000. Check sought to have the orders reviewed but failed to pay
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an order to pay in March 2015 that Sesek ignored. In June of 2017, he was
convicted for failing to comply with the order to pay and was sentenced to thirty
days in jail, in addition to a CAD 20,000 fine.65
4.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The data establish clearly that ESOs use low-level deterrence measures very
infrequently and that higher-level deterrence measures are extremely rare and
only used when employers and other duty holders defy the authority of the ESO
by disobeying compliance orders. Most employers who violate the ESA can expect
that if the violation is detected the worst that will happen is that they will be
ordered to comply with the law and to pay what they owed, without any penalty.
But does this finding establish a deterrence gap? As indicated at the outset, the
answer to that question depends on how one conceptualizes the role of deterrence
in enforcing employment standards. While each of the two theoretical approaches
we discussed identifies a role for deterrence, there are significant differences in their
analysis of when and how to apply sanctions.
4.3.[a] Responsive Regulation
Responsive regulation takes the view that compliance measures should be used first
and that enforcement officials should only use deterrence when compliance mea-
sures have failed, beginning first with low-level sanctions and only escalating to
higher-level sanctions if lower-level sanctions do not work. One could argue that
Ontario adheres to this model. It is certainly true that ESOs resort to compliance
measures whenever a violation is detected and recorded, although there are some
instances in which low-level sanctions are also imposed.
The AMES advises ESOs that NOCs are appropriate ‘when the officer believes
that the employer was aware of their responsibilities under the Act but was deliberately
non-compliant’.66 With regard to tickets, the AMES broadly advises that: ‘Part I
prosecutions generally are used for first offenders of less serious offences’.67 This advice
the amount owing in trust to the Director of Employment Standards. As a result, the reviews were
dismissed. When he did not pay the orders, a Part III prosecution was launched. Check unsuccessfully
challenged the prosecution and was subsequently convicted. See All Pool Solutions, [2009] O.E.S.A.D.
No. 67; All Pool Solutions, [2009] O.E.S.A.D. No. 106; R. v. Check, 2012, O.J. 6410 (OCJ). Check
had pleaded bankruptcy and so perhaps in part the jail sentence was imposed because the small
likelihood of collecting the fine.
65 Sarah Mojtehedzadeh, Jail Sentence for Boss Who Owed Workers $125,000, (Toronto Star 6 June 2017)
(accessed 9 Aug. 2018).
66 Ontario Ministry of Labour, supra n. 53, at Ch. 7.5.7.
67 Ibid., at 7A.4.1.
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is preceded by a lengthier discussion of the objectives of the prosecution policy
(applying to Part I and Part III prosecutions), which states that general and specific
deterrence are necessary to ensure compliance with the ESA. The AMES identifies a
number of factors that the ESO should take into account in deciding whether a
prosecution is warranted. These include the seriousness or gravity of the offence,
history of compliance, mitigating or aggravating circumstances, availability of effective
alternatives to prosecution, program identification of targeted contraventions for gen-
eral deterrence and the necessity of maintaining public confidence in the legislation.68
One could argue that based on the formal prosecution policy, Ontario embraces a
pyramidmodel of enforcement. However, in practice, the enforcement pyramid looks
something like Figure 2, that is, a flat pyramid with rarely used deterrence measures at
the top. Of course, one could still argue that there is no deterrence gap, but that would
require making large and implausible assumptions that employer violations of the ESA
are almost always the result of ignorance or incompetence and that once violations are
detected Ontario employers become fully ESA-compliant.69
One indication that compliance is not achieved following the detection of a
violation comes from a recent enforcement blitz conducted from 1 September to
31 October 2016 that targeted workplaces with past employment standards viola-
tions. During the blitz, which involved 104 inspections, the government found
that seventy-five of the employers with records of past violations were still not fully
compliant with the ESA. The ESB does not provide a breakdown of the violations
detected and recorded, but does report that it recovered CAD 125,267 for
employees, so clearly monetary violations were involved in at least some cases.
These results strongly indicate that employers who have been subject to compli-
ance measures in the past show a significant propensity to re-offend.
Moreover, according to the theory of responsive regulation, employers who were
caught re-offending should be subject to some kind of deterrence measure since they
had not learned their lesson after being subject to compliance measures. Although the
government announced before the blitz is was adopting a zero tolerance policy,
suggesting it would apply deterrence measures to repeat offenders, in fact, nothing
like that occurred. Of the 103 employers inspected, ESOs found that seventy-five had
re-offended. ESOs issued 227 compliance orders, and employers voluntarily complied
with all of them. But these were repeat offenders who had already been given a chance
to comply without penalty for their first violations. Therefore, a zero tolerance policy
in the context of responsive regulation should have resulted in penalties for all repeat
offenders. Yet ESOs only issued fifteen NOCs and twenty-seven tickets. Assuming no
employer was subject to more than one low-level deterrence measure, at most only
68 Ibid., at 7A.2–3.
69 For arguments against making these assumptions, see Vosko et al., supra n. 11.
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55% of repeat offenders were punished.70 So even by the standards of responsive
regulation, there is strong evidence of a deterrence gap.
4.3.[b] Strategic Enforcement Model
It is arguable that the ESB has adopted some elements of strategic enforcement model.
Targeted inspections have become more prominent and convictions are publicized on
the Ministry’s website. However, it is clearly the case that the Ministry does not use
deterrence nearly as frequently as is called for by the strategic enforcement model. To
recall, the model called for the routine imposition of civil monetary penalties for
violators and especially for repeat violators.71 Although strictly speaking Ontario does
not have a system of civil monetary penalties, NOCs serve a very similar function: they
involve the imposition of a small monetary penalty, which can only be contested at the
OLRB, an administrative agency. But, as we saw, NOCs are rarely used and it is the
policy that tickets are preferred if the violation is ticketable. Of course, if ESOs
routinely issued tickets for violations, they would be a functional equivalent of a
civil monetary penalty, but they are not. As we saw, close to 97% of violations result in
no penalty whatsoever. By this measure, the deterrence gap is immense.
The same conclusion holds true if we consider the role of higher-level sanctions.
Weil recommends high profile prosecutions, yet these are rarely undertaken.72
Criminal prosecutions are off the table and, with regard to Part III prosecutions, we
have seen that the fines are generally quite low relative to the maximum and there is
little publicity beyond the posting of the conviction on the Ministry’s website. There
are, however, exceptions, as we saw in the Blondin, Check, and Sesek cases, which
resulted in jail sentences and, at least in the Blondin case, the prosecution attracted a
great amount of publicity in the media, which law firms amplified in client newsletters.
But these cases truly are the exceptions that, so to speak, prove the rule that high profile
prosecution activity is rare. Finally, there is no evidence that Ontario has adopted a
strategy of using deterrence measures against lead firms in order to secure their
commitment to enforcing ESA compliance by their subcontractors, franchisees and
other subordinate entities in their supply chains.
While our finding of a deterrence gap in Ontario is obviously a matter of local
interest, it has broader relevance to scholars and officials concerned with minimum
employment standards enforcement in other jurisdictions. First, it is a cautionary tale.
Ontario is not a jurisdiction that has wholeheartedly embraced an RNG approach to
70 Ontario Ministry of Labour, Blitz Results: Repeat Offenders/Zero Tolerance (2017c), https://www.
labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/inspections/blitzresults_rvzt2016.php (accessed 9 Aug. 2018).
71 Weil, supra n. 10, 2008.
72 Weil, supra n. 15.
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ES enforcement, but rather has responded to political pressure for stronger enforce-
ment, including the creation of additional deterrence measures and, some commit-
ment in principle to their expanded use. However, notwithstanding this partial
acceptance of the need for a more deterrence-oriented approach, ESOs do not even
use low-level deterrence measures to the extent expected of a government fully
committed to responsive regulation and the enforcement pyramid. Elsewhere we
look more closely at some of the field-level impediments to increasing the use of
deterrence measures, but for present purposes our findings strongly suggest that
increasing the use of deterrence measures in any jurisdiction is likely going to be
difficult, even when there is political pressure for doing so.73
A second and related lesson is that the proclaimed policy of government may
mask what is occurring on the ground. This applies with particular force to those
jurisdictions committed to RNG policies like responsive regulation that are legiti-
mated in part because they declare that although the hammer of deterrence is
usually hidden, it is available and will be used when compliance measures fail. The
reality may be that deterrence is not only hidden, but stored in a closed toolbox
that is difficult to pry open. The result is not third-way regulation but regulatory
degradation and failure.74
Finally, our case study adds to the evidence from many jurisdictions and from
the beginning of labour inspections nearly two centuries ago which strongly
suggest that deterrence gaps are the norm, not the exception, in the enforcement
of protective labour and employment laws. As leaders of the Ontario labour
movement observed more than hundred years ago in relation to the enforcement
of the factory act:
It has been the experience of every labour man that after … an Act … has become law the
trouble has only commenced, for you have got to keep hammering away all the time to
make the Government put the law in force … [W]hile there are government inspectors
appointed to do the work, [they] will not do their duty … to prosecute a manufacturer
who is deliberately violating the Act 75
5 CONCLUSION
Nearly every serious enforcement model recognizes the need for deterrence, even
while there is disagreement about its role.76 Our study finds that regardless of
73 L. F. Vosko & the Closing the Enforcement Gap Research Group, Closing the Employment Standards
Enforcement Gap: Improving Protections for People in Precarious Jobs (in press).
74 S. Tombs & D. Whyte, A Deadly Consensus? Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation Under New
Labour, 50 Brit. J. Crim. 46 (2010).
75 Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Proceedings 10-11 (1899).
76 It should also be noted there is evidence that deterrence works. E.g. a recent study found that wage
theft laws which dramatically increase punitive damages awards to victims reduce the incidence of
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whether we adopt a light-touch model, like responsive regulation, or a proactive
model, like strategic enforcement, as our baseline, there is a deterrence gap in ESA
enforcement in Ontario. This finding adds to the large body of international
evidence that points to deterrence gaps as longstanding norms.
If that is the case, a key question is how to close the deterrence gap. Simply
changing the model is not enough, since, as we have seen, there is a significant risk
that a gap will open between the law and policy on the books and the law and
policy on the ground. We do not have an easy solution to this problem. Indeed, if
there was a magic bullet no doubt it would have already been fired. But perhaps
one positive step has been the campaign to characterize ES violations as ‘wage
theft’ thus challenging dominant normative, political, and cultural understandings
of the law as one that merely regulates private and consensual relations between
workers, rather than as a law that addresses a serious public wrong.77 Effective
enforcement, however, is like to remain an ongoing struggle.
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Figure 1 Compliance and Deterrence Measures
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minimum wage violations. See D. Galvin, Deterring ‘Wage Theft’: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy
Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, Perspect. Polit. 324 (2016).
77 Tucker, supra n. 47; K. Bobo,Wage Theft in America: Why Millions of Working Americans Are Not Getting
Paid and What We Can Do About It (The New Press 2009).
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